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Constitutional Law-FouRTH AMENDMENT-THE "SEARCH ALL PERSONS" POWER-DoEs PRESENCE REALLY EQuAL PROBABLE CAUSE?
State v. De Simone, 60 N.J. 319, 288 A.2d 849 (1972)
Eleven states empower their police, when executing a search warrant, to search all persons found on the premises described therein.'
As a general rule, this authorization reflects an attempt by the various
state legislatures to increase the efficacy of law enforcement in the areas
of illegal gambling and drug control.8 The instrumentalities of these
crimes are small and easily concealable, making it a simple task for
offenders to frustrate the purpose of an ordinary warrant. Proponents
of the "search all persons" rule argue that in the absence of this
power, crime control can be thwarted by quick transfer of contraband
to a person not named in the warrant.
Notwithstanding the undeniable existence of this problem, several
courts4 have found the search all persons solution unconstitutional. 5
1 Three states grant this power through a specified form of warrant. DEL. CODE ANN
tit. 11, § 2310 (Supp. 1970); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 276, § 2A (1968); N.H. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 595-A:3 (Supp. 1972). The remaining eight states authorize this police action without setting forth an "approved" warrant. CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 54-8b (1968); GA. CODE
ANN. § 27-309 (Supp. 1970); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 88, § 108-9 (Smith-Hurd 1970); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 22-2509 (Supp. 1971); MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 95-710 (1969); NaV. RaV. STAT.
§ 179.055 (1971); N.Y. CIuM. PRO. LAw § 690.15 (McKinney 1971); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 968.16
(1971).
2 E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 88, § 108-9 (Smith-Hurd 1970) provides:
In the execution of the warrant the person executing the same may reasonably
detain to search any person in the place at the time:
(a) To protect himself from attack, or
(b) To prevent the disposal or concealment of any instruments, articles or
things particularly described in the warrant.
8 See Revision Committee Comments to ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 108-9 (Smith-Hurd
1970), where it is stated that "[t]he need for this power arises most often in the narcotics
cases where disposition is most easily effected."
4 There are only a few reported cases dealing directly with this subject. Two reasons
may explain this dearth of cases. First, an exercise of the power, whether constitutional
or not, presents a prima fade case for the validity of the search. A poor person may lack
the resources to mount a constitutional attack. A decision not to contest the search is
even more likely if the defendant is offered an attractive plea bargain. In such a case, the
search all persons power serves its purpose without challenge. Needless to say, a conviction
like this is not reported. Second, when the police enter a premises with the power to search
all people present, and they begin to do so, suspicious activity on the part of those waiting
their turn to be searched will often be induced. See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 440 S.W.2d 808
(Tex. Grim. App. 1969). Once this occurs, the police do not have to base their subsequent
arrest and search of such "suspicious" people on their statutory power but can rely on the
activity of those people in the presence of the police. The search all persons power is
clearly, however, the triggering mechanism for the entire scenario.
5 United States v. Festa, 192 F. Supp. 160 (D. Mass. 1960); State v. Wise, 284 A.2d 292
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The fourth amendment requires a judicial finding of probable cause
as a condition precedent to the issuance of a search warrant.6 Moreover,
the warrant must particularly describe the person or place to be
searched7 Under the search all persons doctrine neither the magistrate
issuing the warrant nor the police requesting it know who will be
present at the time of search. Consequently, with respect to the person
searched, the warrant meets neither of the conditions required for
issuance.
These constitutional doubts have haunted courts which have upheld the search all persons procedure.8 Several courts have resorted to
analysis of the facts of the particular search in order to fit the case into
a constitutional mold. For example, one case imposed a reasonableness
test on the activity of the police.9 The court stated that its decision to
sustain the validity of the search under the facts of the case before
it did not mean that such an all persons search would be valid under
all circumstances.' 0 It would be up to the police to show the reasonableness of their search in each instance.' 1
Other courts have cast their holdings in terms so broad as virtually
to emasculate the language of the warrant or the relevant statute. One
case held that the executing officer had the power to search a person,
unnamed in the warrant, if circumstances observed by the officer gave
2
him probable cause to believe that a crime was being committed.'
Under this formulation, even in the absence of any special statutory
power, it would be the policeman's right, in fact his duty, to search the
subject. In another case upholding the power of the police to search
(Del. Super. Ct. 1971); Purkey v. Mabey, 33 Idaho 281, 193 P. 79 (1920); Garrett v. State,

270 P.2d 1101 (Okla. Grim. App. 1954); Crossland v. State, 266 P.2d 649 (Okla. Grim. App.
1954); State v. Massie, 95 W. Va. 233, 120 S.Y. 514 (1923). A survey of the cases cited in
this footnote and in note 8 infra will reveal that the search all persons theory has been
litigated in jurisdictions which have not granted this power by statute. It appears that
unless there is a direct prohibition against the doctrine, magistrates feel free to issue warrants which include a directive to the police to search all persons present. The relevancy
of this discussion is thus not confined to the 11 states listed in note 1 supra.
6 U.S. GONsr. amend. IV.
7 Id.
8 See, e.g., State v. Procce, 5 Conn. Cir. 637, 260 A.2d 413 (1969); Samuel v. State, 222
So. 2d 3 (Fla. 1969); Willis v. State, 122 Ga. App. 455, 177 S.E.2d 487 (1970); State v. Pugh,
69 Ill. App. 2d 312, 217 N.E.2d 557 (1966); People v. Nicoletti, 60 Misc. 2d 108, 302
N.Y.S.2d 618 (Niagara County Ct. 1969); Johnson v. State, 440 S.W.2d 308 (rex. Grim. App.
1969).
9 Willis v. State, 122 Ga. App. 455, 177 S.E.2d 487 (1970).
10 Id. at 459, 177 S.E.2d at 489.
11 Id., 177 SXE.2d at 489-90.
12 State v. Procce, 5 Conn. Gir. 637, 645, 260 A.2d 413, 418 (1969).
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party,8

an unnamed
the court supported its decision by noting that the
suspicious action of the subject in the presence of an officer in itself
provided probable cause for a search of his person. 14
These cases suggest that even courts upholding the search all
persons doctrine recognize its constitutional difficulties and, whenever
possible, attempt to justify the police activity on other grounds. Thus,
although the search all persons power may have great practical value,
most courts consider it legally suspect.
I
State v. De Simone
Chief Justice Weintraub of New Jersey, in the most sweeping
and forceful opinion yet written in favor of this police practice, recently
held the search all persons investigation a valid and necessary tool
of law enforcement.' 5 State v. De Simone involved a police investigation
of a lottery operation which used an unattended automobile as a
"drop" for the participants in the illegal scheme. 16 Some of these
individuals would come to the "drop" area in cars; others would
arrive on foot. By checking motor vehicle registrations, the police discovered that several of those involved had past connections with illegal
gambling. Warrants were obtained to search six automobiles observed
at the "drop"; 17 the defendant, De Simone, was a passenger in one of
them. Pursuant to the warrant directing a search of the vehicle and
"persons found therein,""' De Simone was searched. The police found
lottery slips and other paraphernalia which were critical evidence in
the ultimate conviction of De Simone. The appellate division reversed
the conviction, finding no basis upon which to include unnamed passengers in the search warrant.' 9 The state appealed to the New Jersey
Supreme Court.
Johnson v. State, 440 S.W.2d 308 (rex. Crim. App. 1969).
Id. at 310. During a search for marihuana, the police considered it "suspicious"
that one individual reached into his pocket, put something in his mouth, and apparently
swallowed it.
15 State v. De Simone, 60 NJ. 319, 288 A.2d 849 (1972).
10 Id. at 323, 288 A.2d at 851.
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 See id. at 321, 288 A.2d at 850. The decision of the New Jersey Superior Court,
Appellate Division, is unreported.
One of the appellate division judges dissented. Although he felt that the "all persons"
clause in the warrant did not meet the description requirements of the fourth amend'3
14

1973]

_RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

In sustaining De Simone's conviction, Weintraub devised a twopronged test for determining the constitutional validity of the search
all persons approach in any particular fact situation. First, there
must be a showing of probable cause concerning the premises to be
searched.2 0 Second, there must be reasonable grounds for believing
that all persons on the premises will be participants in the criminal
activity.21 In De Simone, Chief Justice Weintraub found both parts
of the test satisfied.22 He was convinced that it was reasonable to
suspect that every person in a car at the time of a "drop" would be
involved in the illicit operation.23 Therefore, in his view, the search
24
of De Simone was reasonable.

Clearly, Weintraub does not envision his test being confined to
automobile cases.2 5 Several decisions dealing with a variety of premises
-stores, restaurants, and apartments-are cited as authority for his
formulation. 26 Before De Simone, the search all persons procedure,
although formally approved by only a small number of states, was
widely used because of its practical value and despite its questionable
ment, he would have remanded the case in order to determine whether, apart from the
warrant, there was probable cause to make the search. Id.
20 Id. at 322, 288 A.2d at 850.
21 "So long as there is good reason to suspect or believe that anyone present at the
anticipated scene will probably be a participant, presence becomes the descriptive fact
satisfying the aim of the Fourth Amendment." Id.
Weintraub does not require that the authorities allege satisfaction of the second part
of this test in their application for a search warrant. He approved the search in De Simone
notwithstanding that the affidavits for the warrants made no mention of passengers. Id.
at 325, 288 A.2d at 852. Thus, there will be no pre-search judicial decision explicitly concerned with the reasonableness of believing that all persons found on the premises -will be
engaged in criminal activity.
In addition to the idea that an individual's privacy probably deserves the protection of
such a pre-search ruling, there is a procedural aspect to consider. Once a search has revealed incriminating evidence, courts are reluctant to find the search invalid. Weintraub
phrases the issue in De Simone as "whether the truth revealed by the search shall be suppressed and a false judgment of not guilty entered." Id. at 323, 288 A.2d at 851.
22 Id. at 325, 288 A.2d at 852.
23 Id.
24 [W]ith regard to the Fourth Amendment demand for specificity as to the subject to be searched, there is none of the vice of a general warrant if the individual
is thus identified by physical nexus to the on-going criminal event itself.

Id. at 322, 288 A.2d at 850.
25 [A] showing that a dice game is operated in a manhole or in a barn should
suffice, for the reason that the place is so limited and the illegal operation so overt
that it is likely that everyone present is a party to the offense.
Id.
20 Weintraub cites, inter alia, United States v. Festa, 192 F. Supp. 160 (D. Mass. 1960)
(bargain shoe store), Samuel v. State, 222 So. 2d 3 (Fla. 1969) (apartment), Garrett v.
State, 270 P.2d 1101 (Okla. Crim. App. 1954) (filling station and beer hall), and State v.
Massie, 95 W. Va. 233, 120 S.E. 514 (1923) (poolroom). 60 N.J. at 327-28, 288 A.2d at 853-54.
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legality. Now, with Chief Justice Weintraub giving the doctrine a measure of legitimacy, many states may hasten to add this weapon to their
law enforcement arsenal and openly begin to encourage its use.
II
REMAINING CONSTITUTIONAL DOUBTS

Notwithstanding the likelihood that Chief Justice Weintraub's
arguments will influence other courts and state legislatures, fundamental questions concerning the constitutionality of the search all
persons practice persist.27 In situations in which his two-pronged test
is met, the Chief Justice is willing to construe presence at a specified
location where criminal activity is suspected as conforming to the
description requirements of the fourth amendment.28 But under his
theory, the only description given is that of the premises to be searched.
No designation of the person eventually searched, either by name or by
physical description, is possible; neither the police nor the magistrate
know who will be present at the suspected location.
In the De Simone situation, the authorities seek to invade two areas
of privacy-the premises and the person of the unnamed occupant.
Weintraub's opinion would allow them to accomplish this two-tiered
invasion by meeting the description requirements for only the first tier,
the premises.2 9 Two substantial incursions into the right of privacy are
27 The protections afforded private citizens by the fourth amendment are the result
of a passionate contempt which the colonists had for the British methods of search and
seizure. The English would routinely issue general warrants or sanction warrantless searches.
See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 761 (1969). The decision to invade a person's privacy was summarily made by the invaders without the necessity or provision for a judicial
review. By placing a citizen's privacy at the mercy of police discretion, the right to privacy
was in reality made the privilege of privacy. In order to preclude such summary procedure,
the fourth amendment requires in all but the most urgent cases that an impartial magistrate pass on the requests of the police to search. Minimal discretion is to be left in the
hands of the police. "[P]robable cause must be determined by a 'neutral and detached
magistrate,' and not by 'the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting
out crime.'" Spinelli v. United States, 893 U.S. 410, 415 (1969) (citation omitted); see note
41 infra.
28 See notes 21 & 24 and accompanying text supra.

29 The ambiguity inherent in the term "presence" indicates that De Simone's emphasis may be misplaced. If a warrant issues for a particular building, whether a person
standing outside the building but within the property limits would be subject to search
is open to question. Traditionally, fourth amendment protection as applied to houses
extends to open areas immediately adjacent to the house. See, e.g., Wattenberg v. United
States, 588 F.2d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 1968). Under this theory, a person standing near the
doorway to the house would be within the protected area and therefore would be considered on the premises for which the warrant had issued. He would thus be subject to
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allowed for the price normally exacted from the authorities for just one.
Such a bargain necessarily raises doubts concerning the constitutional
quality of the goods.
In both Katz v. United Statesso and Terry v. Ohio,3 1 the Supreme
Court clearly stated that the protection of the fourth amendment
runs to people, not to places. Indeed, no matter where an individual
is, he carries with him the protective cloak of the fourth amendment.3 2
To remove that cloak would seem to require a more personal description than a mere designation of the premises where the individual happens to be found.33
Similar problems are presented by Weintraub's "presence equals
probable cause" framework. In United States v. Di Re,3 4 the Supreme
Court decided a case with a fact situation very similar to that of De
Simone. The authorities had stopped a car, suspecting the driver of
selling counterfeit gasoline ration coupons. When a police informant
in the car told the police that the driver had just sold him counterfeit
tickets, the police searched and arrested the driver and then searched
search under De Simone. A newer theory posits that whatever area the owner or occupant
of the premises wishes to keep private is deserving of the fourth amendment's protection.
See, e.g., United States v. Freeman, 426 F.2d 1351, 1354 (9th Cir. 1970); Wattenberg v. United

States, supra at 857. Under this theory a person standing near the doorway would not be
within a protected area because any person could openly and peacefully go up to the door-

way of a residence for business, political, or other purposes. See, e.g., Davis v. United
States, 327 F.2d 301, 303 (9th Cir. 1964). This area is not meant to be kept private by the
resident. Therefore, it is not entitled to fourth amendment protection and is not a part
of the premises for which a warrant is required prior to search. It is conceivable that in a
future case under De Simone an individual's fourth amendment rights will not hinge on
specific description or probable cause but rather on which of the two theories is used or
exactly where on the premises the defendant was standing.
30 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
al 392 US. 1, 9 (1968).
32 [The defendant] did not shed his right to [privacy] ... simply because he made
his calls from a place where he might be seen. No less than an individual in a
business office, in a friend's apartment, or in a taxicab, a person in a telephone
booth may rely upon the protection of the Fourth Amendment.
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967) (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
a3 In ruling that the inclusion of the "all persons" clause in a search warrant did not
meet the constitutional requirement of particular description when applied to a person
unnamed in the warrant, the Delaware Superior Court in State v. Wise, 284 A.2d 292,
294 (1971) stated:
It would seem that the Constitutional provisions are sufficiently dear. They
require specificity. The only specificity found in the instant warrant, the application therefor and the affidavit, directly apply to one person only, i.e., [the proprietor of the premises].
The search of the defendant, who was found on the premises when the police made their
search, was held unconstitutional even though the description of the premises themselves
was sufficient.
84 332 U.S. 581 (1948).
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Di Re, the third occupant of the car. The government argued that when
the contraband sought was so small, common sense dictated a right to
search all passengers in the automobile.3 5 Emphatic in holding the
search unconstitutional, the Court responded, "We are not convinced
that a person, by mere presence in a suspected car, loses immunities
from search of his person to which he would otherwise be entitled."86
Sibron v. New York3 7 involved similar legal issues. The police had
observed the defendant conversing with six to eight known narcotic
addicts over an eight-hour period. The Supreme Court held that the
subsequent search of the defendant could not be supported merely
by his observed association with the addicts. The search was therefore
declared unconstitutional.3 8 If, in Sibron, the defendant's association
with known narcotic addicts was not sufficient probable cause to validate a search of his person, it is difficult to see how presence at a premises merely suspected of harboring narcotics activities would provide
sufficient probable cause for a similar invasion.
A related problem under De Simone exists in police determination
of whom to search upon entering a premises and being confronted with
several individuals unnamed in the warrant. In this situation, the
fourth amendment guarantee that all people shall be "secure in
their persons" hinges upon the whims of the police. State v. Wise,39 a
Delaware case, presented this very situation. When the police arrived
at the designated building, alleged to house an illegal gambling operation, several people unnamed in the warrant were present. The defendant made no move to flee or resist, yet he was the only unnamed person
35 Id. at 586.
36 Id. at 587. The Court expanded on its reasoning in a way that applies even more
directly to the present discussion:
The Government says it would not contend that, armed with a search warrant
for a residence only, it could search all persons found in it. But an occupant of a
house could be used to conceal this contraband on his person quite as readily as
can an occupant of a car. Necessity, an argument advanced in support of this
search, would seem as strong a reason for searching guests of a house for which a
search warrant had issued as for search of guests in a car for which none had been
issued. By a parity of reasoning with that on which the Government disclaims the
right to search occupants of a house, we suppose the Government would not contend that if it had a valid search warrant for the car only it could search the occupants as an incident to its execution. How then could we say that the right to
search a car without a warrant confers greater latitude to search occupants than

a search by warrant would permit?
Id.

392 U.S. 40 (1968).
88 "The inference that persons who talk to narcotics addicts are engaged in the criminal traffic in narcotics is simply not the sort of reasonable inference required to support
an intrusion by the police upon an individual's personal security." Id. at 62,
37

89 284 A.2d 292 (Del. Super. Ct. 1971).
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searched. 40 This arbitrary power to determine whom to search
which the search all persons doctrine grants to law enforcement officials
runs notoriously afoul of the constitutional guarantees designed to strip
authorities of this ability.41 In Wise, the court held that the addition
of an "all persons" clause to a warrant directing the search of a premises
did not meet the fourth amendment requirements of specific description
42
as applied to the defendant. The search was therefore ruled invalid.
De Simone does not require that the application, affidavit, or warrant include a showing of probable cause for belief that all persons
present at the suspected premises will be involved in the crime. 43 Under
Weintraub's formulation, the reasonableness of this belief, the second
part of his test, is a question properly held for judicial review after the
search. 44 Arguably, since there is no pre-search judicial finding of probable cause to substantiate the invasion of the unnamed occupant's privacy, that invasion is really no more than a warrantless search. Its validity
thus hinges upon the existence of a compelling police need to make this
type of warrantless search. 45 Proponents of the search all persons
doctrine feel that the government needs this power 46 to ensure successful execution of searches for small contraband. 47 If, however, this purpose can be effected by a procedure more harmonious with the
40 The operator of the premises was the only individual named in the warrant. He
was searched along with the defendant, Eugene Wise. Id. at 293.
41 The presence of a search warrant serves a high function. Absent some grave
emergency, the Fourth Amendment has interposed a magistrate between the citizen
and the police. This was done not to shield criminals nor to make the home a
safe haven for illegal activities. It was done so that an objective mind might weigh
the need to invade that privacy in order to enforce the law. The right of privacy
was deemed too precious to entrust to the discretion of those whose job is the
detection of crime and the arrest of criminals.
McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455-56 (1948).
42 284 A.2d at 294.
43 In De Simone, the affidavits for the search warrants made no mention of passengers
in the suspected cars. 60 N.J. at 325, 288 A.2d at 852.
44 This discussion assumes that the warrant has an "all persons" clause. In a state
which grants this power by statute, the warrant would probably not contain even this
cryptic allusion to the underlying ability which the police possess. A judicial pre-search
determination of reasonableness as to the search all persons power is even less likely in
these jurisdictions than in a De Simone situation.
45 We cannot be true to that constitutional requirement [for a warrant] and excuse the absence of a search warrant without a showing by those who seek exemption from the constitutional mandate that the exigencies of the situation made
that course imperative.
McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 456 (1948).
46 See State v. De Simone, 60 NJ. 319, 322, 288 A.2d 849, 851 (1972); notes 1-3 and
accompanying text supra.

47 See note 3 and accompanying text supra.
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essential safeguards found in the fourth amendment, the search all
48
persons method should be rejected.
III
AvAiABn.

ALTERATVs

One possible alternative to Weintraub's formulation would be to
require that an application for a search warrant include an allegation
of probable cause concerning unknown people the police might find
at the designated premises. This would at least ensure an advance judicial determination of the reasonableness of believing that everyone
present would be involved in the wrongdoing. Unfortunately, this approach does not escape the inherent problem of the De Simone rationale. Search of an individual would still be authorized without49meeting
the specific constitutional requirements as to that individual.
Section two of the Uniform Arrest Act,50 now the law in several
states,51 offers a more acceptable solution. Under this provision, the
police, if justifiably suspicious of the circumstances surrounding a
person's presence at a suspected premises, may detain the individual
for questioning. 52 If his answers do not satisfy the police, they may
further detain and question the suspect for a period not to exceed two
hours.as Meanwhile, the police may attempt to obtain a warrant to
48 "[There is 'no ready test for determining reasonableness other than by balancing
the need to search [or seize] against the invasion which the search [or seizure] entails.'"
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968), quoting Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523,
536-37 (1967).

49 See notes 20-24 and accompanying text supra.
50 (1) A peace officer may stop any person abroad who he has reasonable ground
to suspect is committing, has committed or is about to commit a crime, and may
demand of him his name, address, business abroad, and whither he is going.
(2) Any person so questioned who fails to identify himself or explain his actions
to the satisfaction of the officer may be detained and further questioned and investigated.
(3) The total period of detention provided for by this section shall not exceed
two hours. The detention is not an arrest and shall not be recorded as an arrest
in any official record. At the end of the detention the person so detained shall be
released or be arrested and charged with a crime.
UNIFORM Aarsr Acr § 2. For the full text of the Act, see Warner, The Uniform Arrest
Act, 28 VA. L. Ray. 315, 343-47 (1942).
51 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1902 (Supp. 1970); N.H. Rmv. STAT. ANN. § 594:2
(Supp. 1972).
Amessr A'r § 2; see, e.g., State v. Wise, 284 A.2d 292, 294 (Del. Super. Ct.
52 UNiFORm
1971).
53 Uwoam Ams Acr § 2.
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search the suspect by laying all of the information gained in their
4
investigation before a magistrate.5
Although under the Uniform Arrest Act an individual may be
detained for up to two hours, he will not be searched 55 without a warrant. Such warrant will issue only after the police have questioned the
suspect and presented the facts for a judicial determination of probable
cause. The Uniform Arrest Act procedure still allows the authorities to conduct an effective search of the premises under the initial
warrant; when applied to the individual, it adheres to the warrant, probable cause, and specific description requirements of the fourth amendment, in contrast to the search all persons practice. It provides an
innocent person who happens to be on the premises for legitimate
purposes the opportunity to explain his presence to the police. Having
done so to their satisfaction, he would not be further detained. Under
the search all persons rationale, however, he could be-and most likely
would be-exposed to an immediate search of his person.
Although detention under the Uniform Arrest Act is still a
"seizure" of the suspect, 56 its reasonableness, and therefore its constitutionality, must be determined in light of all the surrounding circumstances. 57 Weighed against this partial deprivation of personal liberty
58
would be the government's interest in crime prevention and detection.
In any individual case the constitutionality of the search or seizure
See State v. Wise, 284 A.2d 292, 294 (Del. Super. Ct. 1971).
55 Chief Justice Warren laid to rest the idea that a search, even a "frisk-type" search,
was a mere petty indignity by calling such a notion "fantastic" and footnoting a description of such a search.
Mhe officer must feel with sensitive fingers every portion of the prisoner's body.
A thorough search must be made of the prisoner's arms and armpits, waistline and
back, the groin and area about the testicles, and entire surface of the legs down
to the feet.
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 17 n.13 (1968), citing Priar & Martin, Searching and Disarming
Criminals,45 J. CRIm. L.C. & P.S. 481 (1954).
56 "It must be recognized that whenever a police officer accosts an individual and
restrains his freedom to walk away, he has 'seized' that person." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,
16 (1968).
57 The scheme of the Fourth Amendment becomes meaningful only when it is
assured that at some point the conduct of those charged with enforcing the laws
can be subjected to the more detached, neutral scrutiny of a judge who must
evaluate the reasonableness of a particularsearch or seizure in light of the particular circumstances.
Id. at 21 (emphasis added).
58 [Mt is this interest which underlies the recognition that a police officer may in
appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner approach a person for
purposes of investigating possibly criminal behavior even though there is no
probable cause to make an arrest.
Id. at 22.
54
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necessarily depends on its fidelity to the fourth amendment. This is
true no matter what procedure is authorized by the state.5 9 The argument is not that the Uniform Arrest Act is constitutional per se, but
rather that as a procedural standard it is less offensive to those safeguards than is the search all persons method.60
CONCLUSION

The search all persons power is undeniably a potent method for
ensuring the successful execution of warrants issued to search a specified premises. Fourth amendment considerations, however, point to a
tension between the efficiency of this technique and its constitutionality.
The substantial pre-De Simone doubt concerning the validity of the
search all persons technique must be viewed as the main reason for its
statutory adoption in only eleven states. De Simone, however, has
presented a persuasive argument for the validity of such a search in
certain situations, and may precipitate a trend toward its universal
acceptance and inspire its broader application. Hopefully, before other
states rush to legitimate the search all persons approach under the
De Simone aegis, they will consider the applicability of Uniform Arrest
Act section two, which accomplishes the same practical purpose but
appears more faithful to the requirements and philosophy of the Constitution.
Richard D. Avil, Jr.
59 In Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 60-61 (1968), the Court, alluding to the Uniform Arrest Act as adopted in New York, stated:
New York is, of course, free to develop its own law of search and seizure to meet
the needs of local law enforcement, and in the process it may call the standards
it employs by any names it may choose. It may not, however, authorize police
conduct which trenches upon Fourth Amendment rights, regardless of the labels
which it attaches to such conhuct. The question in this Court upon review of a
state-approved search or seizure "is not whether the search [or seizure] was authorized by state law. The question is rather whether the search was reasonable
under the Fourth Amendment." (Citations omitted.)
60 For a discussion of the constitutionality of Uniform Arrest Act § 2, see Warner,
supra note 50, at 317-24.

